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Bisceglia: The Florida Treaty and the Gallatin-Vives Misunderstanding

THE FLORIDA TREATY AND THE GALLATIN1
VIVES MISUNDERSTANDING
by LOUIS R. BISCEGLIA *

F

ROM THE TIME IT was announced by His Catholic Majesty
Ferdinand VII in August 1820, that he was sending a minister plenipotentiary to the United States to conduct further negotiations with President Monroe, to the moment General Francisco Vives disembarked in New York on April 7, 1820, from
the packet ship James Monroe, an aura of mystery had enveloped Washington as to the disposition of the Spanish government toward the Florida treaty. 2 For during this time there
had been virtually no official communiques exchanged between
the two governments. John Forsyth, the American minister in
Spain, was for all intents and purposes personna non grata, and
for months he had been given almost no information by the
Spanish government. 3 The question being asked in Washington
was: Did Vives bring along a ratified treaty?
This question was quickly answered, for accompanying Vives
were dispatches from Albert Gallatin and Richard Rush, respectively, American ministers to France and England, where

Mr. Bisceglia is assistant professor of history at Rollins College.
There are several good secondary sources from which the background
to this problem can be obtained. Best among these are Samuel Flagg
Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Founding of American Foreign
Policy (New York, 1949); George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings (New York, 1952); Charles C. Griffin, The United States and the
Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822 (New York, 1937); Philip
C. Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands: The Adams-Onis Treaty of
1819 (Berkeley, 1939). Both Brooks and Griffin widely utilized unpublished Spanish sources. Most of the correspondence dealing with
the ratification problem can be found in Annals of Congress, 1789-1824,
16th Cong., 2nd Sess., 42 vols. (Washington, 1834-1856), XXXVII,
appendix, “Spain-Ratification of the Treaty of 1819,” 1337-1469.
John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams: Comprising
Portions of His Diary from 1795-1848, edited by Charles Francis Adams,
12 vols. (Philadelphia, 1874-1877), V (April 7, 1820), 59-60; John Quincy
Adams, Writings of John Quincy Adams, edited by Worthington C. Ford,
7 vols. (New York, 1913-1917), VII, 5, fn. 2. Ford erroneously places
Vives’ arrival in Washington on March 9, 1820.
For the problems facing Forsyth in Spain see Alvin L. Duckett, John
Forsyth: Political Tactician (Athens, 1962), 42-64.
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Vives had stopped for short conferences on his way to the
United States. 4 On February 12, 1820, Gallatin had met and
discussed the situation with Vives, although the Spaniard did
not have a ratified treaty with him. Gallatin’s letter to the state
department of February 15, 1820, answered one question, but
it raised another equally important issue: Could Vives authorize
the United States immediate possession of Florida upon verification that Washington would pursue a neutral policy with
regard to Spain’s rebellious colonies in South America? In his
letter Gallatin said that Vives had the authority, 5 but the latter
denied this authorization and denied that he had ever remotely
suggested anything to that effect while in Paris. The whole
affair had to be a misunderstanding. 6 Yet it can be reasonably
well established that as long as the issue was to remain important, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams believed what Gallatin said was true-especially in view of the extenuating circumstances that were to arise out of his own “verbal discussions”
with Vives. But before turning to the substance of Vives’
meetings in Paris and subsequent negotiations in the United
States, it is of considerable importance that more be known
about Vives himself, his instructions, and the situation that
prompted his departure from Spain in January 1820.
Major-General Francisco Dionisio Vives was a much decorated soldier. 7 He had achieved a distinguished record during
the Peninsular War. At the time of his appointment he had
no diplomatic experience. Normally this would have disqualified him from being selected to undertake such an important
mission, especially since his opposite number was to be a person
so highly seasoned in the intricacies of diplomacy as John
Quincy Adams. However, it seems that Ferdinand VII distrusted diplomats for displaying the same devious qualities which
4. Adams, Memoirs, V (April 7, 1820), 59-60.
5. Albert Gallatin, Writings of Albert Gallatin, edited by Henry Adams,
3 vols. (New York, 1960), II, 133-36. This letter is also reproduced in
American State Papers, Documents, Legislative and Executive of the
Congress of the United States, Foreign Relations, 6 vols. (Washington,
1832-1861), IV, 678-79. Hereinafter cited as ASPFR. See Annals of
Congress, XXXVII, 16th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1407-09.
6. Adams to Vives, ASPFR, IV, 681-82; Adams, Writings, VII, 5-8; Vives to
the Secretary of State, ASPFR, IV, 682-83 [translation].
7 . See Enciclopedia universal Espasa, LXIX, 712, article, “Francisco Dionisio
Vives,” as cited by Griffin, United States and the Disruption of the
Spanish Empire, 221; Vives’ Credentials, ASPFR, IV, 677-78.
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he himself exhibited.
Other more qualified individuals were
advanced for the mission, but few wanted the task of presenting
impatient American leaders with further possible delays. 9 Don
Francisco was himself reluctant. 10
At the time of his appointment in August 1819, Vives was in
Andulusia with the forces being readied for South America.
For over two months he was quarantined because of a yellow
fever epidemic. Forsyth made inquiry after inquiry into the
matter of the Florida treaty, but the court was then so occupied
with the King’s marriage and the bestowal of the gracias, that
the special nature of Spanish-United States relations was forgotten. 11
Vives finally reached Madrid on November 15, 1819. Another month passed, however, before Forsyth was officially informed of Vives’ appointment, and it was not until January
1820, that he got off a letter to the state department with this
information. 12 Consequently, the United States government was
very much in the dark with respect to Spanish intentions. Monroe’s message of December 7, 1819, called for Congress to grant
him discretionary powers to occupy Florida if the need arose, but
he was willing to postpone any consideration of the matter until
the new Spanish minister arrived. Three weeks later Secretary
of State Adams sent a note to the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Relations that he was expecting the arrival
of the Spanish minister before the end of December 1819. 13
Hence it was with a note of utter despair for his Florida treaty
that Adams advised Monroe to tender another postponement to
Congress. Then on March 18, 1820, he received Forsyth’s notes.
Vives was not expected to reach the United States before May
1820, and the Americans knew no more about his instructions than the fact that he possessed “competent” and “ample”
powers. 14
Griffin, United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 221.
Ibid., 221-22.
Forsyth to Adams, ASPFR, IV, 671.
Ibid., 664, 666-67, 668-70.
Forsyth to Adams, ibid., 671, 674-75.
Adams to Lowndes, Annals of Congress, XXXVII, 16th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 1398. See James Monroe, The Writings of James Monroe, edited
by Stanislaus M. Hamilton, 7 vols. (New York 1898-1902), VI, 106-13.
Also, James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers
of the Presidents, 10 vols. (Washington, 1896-1902), II, 54-58.
14. Adams, Memoirs, V (March 18, 1820), 23-26; Forsyth to Adams, ASPFR,
IV, 674-75.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
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Vives’ instructions were essentially the same as those drawn
up for him six months before. After a preliminary summary of
the dispute with the United States, they state that the Florida
treaty was not acceptable because of the large concession it provided without giving Spain the guarantee that the President
would not recognize “Buenos Ayres.” The chief aim of the
negotiations was to prevent America from either recognizing
or giving aid to the rebel governments. After this point was
settled, Vives would then be willing to discuss the land claims
and financial stipulations He had also been told to try to secure
aid from England by offering it commercial advantages and
not to worry about concluding an agreement with the United
States. If he could induce the state department to reopen negotiations, Spain would consider the mission a success 15
From the time these instructions were first drawn up in
August 1819, until after Vives arrived in Madrid, the Spanish
government had been procrastinating-waiting for a more favorable turn of events before acting. Overtures were made to the
European powers for aid in resolving the difficulties with
America. While the Spaniards confidently expected more favorable conditions, they could not induce the European powers to
support her cause. The Russian, French, and British governments were all in favor of immediate ratification of the Florida
treaty; delay was regarded as a threat to peace. The favorable
winds Spain had expected were not forthcoming. On the contrary, in their stead a veritable gale blew and threatened not
only the properties of the Spanish colonies in South America,
but also the lands beyond the Sabine River in North America.
Even at home the liberal insurgents were restless under the
tyrannical controls imposed upon them by Ferdinand and his
reactionary ministers. Throughout the late fall and early winter
of 1819-1820 hurried reports reached Spain of American filibuster expeditions and rumors of other trouble. Indeed storm
warnings were posted all along the southwestern frontier and
might just as well have been posted at Cadiz. 16 Mateo de la
Serna (charge d’affairs at Washington, and ranking Spanish
official in the United States upon the departure of Luis de Onis
15. The instructions to General Vives are summarized in Griffin, United
States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 222.
16. Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands, 185.
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in May 1819) reported on Monroe’s tour of the southern and
western states in the summer of 1819. The charge issued frantic
reports of the belligerent tone of public opinion which was advocating forceful seizure of Spanish lands “even going to the
point of capturing of Texas.” Similar expressions of concern for
Texas were voiced by the consul at St. Louis with regard to the
exploring expedition of Major Stephan H. Long into Missouri
country. Fears were further compounded by the reports of the
Spanish consulate at Natchitoches with regard to the abortive
efforts of Dr. James Long to “liberate” Texas. Reports also
reached Spain from Mexico. Fear then of losing the Provincias
Internas to the land-ambitious Americans was paramount. Affairs appeared in such a state that in late December 1819, Luis
de Onis, who had returned to Spain, was asked to prepare a
detailed statement of the United States’ naval forces which might
be called out in the event of war. 17
It is possible to conceive that Vives might very well have
been issued some form of verbal instructions to authorize the
occupation of the Floridas by the United States, and in this
manner bind the United States to occupy only the lands stipulated in the treaty, thus preserving the Spanish land beyond the
treaty line from forceful seizure. Certainly neither Vives nor
the Spanish government, in view of the reports received, had
any inkling that the entire tenor of feeling in the United States
had been greatly exaggerated. Furthermore, Spain had vivid
recollections of the sorties launched by James Wilkinson, Andrew Jackson, and General George Mathews, into East and West
Florida prior to the signing of the Adams-Onis treaty.
Vives left Madrid on January 25, 1820, and arrived in Paris
on February 11, 1820. The following day he met with Baron
Pasquier, the French foreign minister. Pasquier in turn invited
Albert Gallatin for an interview the same day to describe the
meeting with Vives. Gallatin pointed out to the Frenchman
that President Monroe would need a more solid guarantee of
Spain’s good faith than simply the same verbal promises that
Luis de Onis had given Adams. “This observation forcibly
struck Mr. Pasquier who said that he would make further inquiries upon that point.” 18 That same evening Gallatin visited
17. Ibid., 185-86, 200, fn. 61.
18. Gallatin, Writings, II, 134.
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the Duke of Fernan-Nunez, Spanish ambassador to France and
in the course of conversation, Fernan-Nunez suggested “that
the grants in dispute might be set aside, the grantees not having
fulfilled certain conditions of formalities; and, after acknowledging that General Vives was not the bearer of the King’s ratification, he hinted that he was authorized to give the United
States satisfactory security that Spain would fulfill her engagements.” 19
Gallatin did not meet General Vives face to face until the
evening of February 13 at a dinner given in honor of Vives by
Pasquier. After dinner Gallatin had a short conversation with
Vives in which the general “repeated in substance what he had
said to Mr. Pasquier.” 20 What next followed was to be of utmost significance: “I then repeated what I said to Mr. Pasquier
respecting the importance of being authorized to exchange the
ratifications of the Florida treaty. He answered that, although
he was not [the bearer of a ratified treaty], he could, in case of
an agreement, give satisfactory security to the United States,
and that it would consist in consenting that they should take
immediate possession of Florida, without waiting for the ratification of the treaty.” 21 When the festivities were over Gallatin
got together with Baron Pasquier to compare notes.
“General Vives repeated in the course of the evening the
same thing to Mr. Pasquier. He [Pasquier] seemed extremely
astonished that the Spanish Government should have adopted
that course rather than to authorize their minister to exchange
at once ratifications, and ascribed it to the singular policy of that
Cabinet [Ferdinand’s reactionary ministers] and their habits
of procrastination, which had been evinced at Vienna, and in
every subsequent negotiation to which Spain has been a party.” 22
It hardly seems conceivable that with such interwoven
sources, Gallatin’s report could be based simply upon a “misunderstanding.” To borrow from the logical mind of John
23
the contents of Gallatin’s letter of February 15,
Quincy Adams,
1820, can be summarized in this manner: First, the Spanish
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Ibid., 134-35.
Ibid., 135.
Ibid.
Ibid., 135-36.
Adams, Memoirs, V (May 5, 1820), 96-98.
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ambassador to France told Gallatin that Vives could give the
United States a satisfactory pledge for security in lieu of a
delay in ratification. Secondly, Vives confirmed this to Gallatin
himself, specifying that the security consisted of giving the
United States possession of Florida without waiting for ratification of the treaty. Thirdly, Vives gave the same information to
Pasquier at separate conversations when Gallatin was not present. And finally, Gallatin and Pasquier at a subsequent meeting
both agreed in their understanding of what the general had
separately said to them; and likewise, both agreed that the
matter was of such immediate importance that the information
should be made known to the United States at once. 24
Vives was no diplomat, and it is entirely possible that in his
meetings in Paris he played his trump card prematurely, as he
was to do later on in his meeting with John Quincy Adams. 25
Vives left France for England on February 14, 1820. Gallatin
sent along his dispatch on February 15 to reach the United
States the same time Vives did. Arriving in England, Vives
then proceeded to comply with his instructions by arranging
two interviews with Castlereagh through the services of the
Duke of San Carlos, the Spanish ambassador to Great Britain.
The whole affair backfired. Instead of consummating an agreement for British aid, the Spaniards were “roundly lectured” by
the British Prime Minister. 26 Thus finding little reason to
remain in London, Vives sailed from Liverpool at the end of
February. 27
While Vives was enroute to New York, Monroe had to send

24. Nevertheless Griffin states, “. . . it is probable that Gallatin counted
too heavily on some vague remark made by the Spanish diplomat.
Fernan-Nunez . . . added to the confusion by hinting Spain might give
way on the land grants, and it also appears that Pasquier misled
Gallatin as to the extent of Vives’ powers. . . .” Griffin, United States
and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 223. Professor Griffin places
emphasis therefore upon Gallatin’s disclaimer letter of August 7, 1820.
See Gallatin, Writings, II, 165-67.
25. Adams, Memoirs, V (April 29, 1820), 79-83.
26. Griffin, United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 224.
27. Rush had reported Vives’ visit to London but evidently was not informed of the meetings with Castlereagh, for when later Hyde de
Neuville, the French minister in the United States, apprised Adams of
this fact Adams expressed disbelief and chalked it up to French
meddling. See Adams, Memoirs, V (April 7, 1820), 59-60; (May 1, 1820),
83-88.
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another message to Congress on March 27, 1820. 28 This was
necessitated by the issuance of the report of the House Committee on Foreign Relations which claimed that since Spain
had not kept its part of the bargain, the United States should
immediately take possession of the Floridas and demand the
lands of Texas as an indemnity. 29 Meanwhile Adams and Monroe had received numerous calls by the French and Russian
ministers to the United States, Hyde de Neuville and Count
Pierre de Poletica, urging them to settle the Spanish matter
amicably. 30 Advised by Adams, who had received Forsyth’s notes
of early January 1820, which placed Vives’ arrival no sooner
than May, 31 and urged on by a letter from the Russian Tsar,
President Monroe responded by calling for a postponement of
the issues until the next session of Congress. 32
Upon the arrival of Vives and the accompanying correspondence from Gallatin, Adams’ position changed somewhat from
the stand he had previously held. Since trouble developed over
Spanish ratification of the Florida treaty in the summer of 1819,
Adams’ position had been fairly consistent. He wanted the
whole affair settled peacefully, but he was also growing impatient. His position was that the President should call on
Congress to grant him discretionary powers to occupy the treaty
lands if the need arose. Adams, continually worried about presenting a united front in the foreign policies of the United
States, tried to keep the legislature’s actions in line with what
the executive was doing. With Hemy Clay as speaker of the
house, this was no small task. 33
28. Monroe, Writings, VI, 117-18; Richardson, Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, II, 69-70.
29. At this time there was no distinction between Committee on Foreign
Relations and Committee on Foreign Affairs. The terms were used
interchangeably in the house. See Annals of Congress, XXXVI, 16th
Cong. 2nd Sess. Vol. 2, 1618-20, Report of the Committee, March 9,
1820.
30. Monroe, Writings, VI, 117-18; Adams, Writings, VII, 2-5.
31. Supra, 250; Forsyth to Adams, ASPER, IV, 671, 674-75.
32. Monroe, Writings, VI, 119-23.
33. For Adams’ ideas on these matters see Adams, Memoirs, V (March 21,
1820), 28-31; (March 29, 1820), 45-48; Adams, Writings, VII, 2-5. On
many occasions Clay voiced his disagreement with the administration’s
policies toward Spain and tried to get resolutions adopted supporting
his own ideas. In the first place he felt that Congress alone had the
power to cede territory, and that no treaty could relinquish territory
without its sanctions. Secondly, he held that the Adams-Onis treaty
ceded territory without an adequate equivalent given in return, and

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol48/iss3/3

8

Bisceglia: The Florida Treaty and the Gallatin-Vives Misunderstanding
G ALLATIN -V IVES

M ISUNDERSTANDING

255

Adams immediately took the Gallatin and Rush dispatches
to the President and told him that the situation had changed
considerably. He felt the negotiations with Vives should be
brought “to a speedy close.” Monroe replied that he “really did
not think we ought to go to war for Florida, or that the nation
would be willing to proceed to that extremity.” Adams agreed,
but now that he had read Gallatin’s letter, he decided the
Floridas might be occupied without risking war. His plan
was one of confident over-reaction. A force should be put together of such size and magnitude that it would make any
Spanish opposition or retaliation unfeasible; in other words,
obviate the necessity of declaring war by simply overwhelming
the Spaniards in Florida. This plan “would deserve consideration whether any other course could be taken consistently with
the honor of the nation.” 34
Meanwhile, Vives had quickly observed, and was informed,
that the rumors that the United States was about to take Texas
were greatly exaggerated. 35 Possibly Mateo de la Serna, who
had been around Washington long enough, told him that it
being this late in the session, that Congress would do nothing. 36
Even if he had been authorized to grant possession of Florida,
any need for now stating so had obviously passed. Vives
officially announced that Forsyth’s conduct had necessitated his
trip, and alluded to unneutral acts by the United States. 37 But
in a “candid” conversation with Adams on April 29, he was
more explicit, and revealed Spain’s apprehension over rumors
of American designs on Texas. He told Adams that “when he
arrived in the United States he had been informed that the
expedition of last summer against Texas [the Dr. James Long
expedition] had been broken up and dissolved . . . that the
hostility against Spain, which had been represented in such
strong colors to the King, seemed to have been greatly exaggerated.” 38

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

therefore it should be abrogated. From the beginning he never liked
the idea of relinquishing claims to Texas. See Henry Clay, The Papers
of Henry Clay, edited by John F. Hopkins, 3 vols. to date (Lexington,
1959), II, 803-16, passim.
Adams, Memoirs, V (April 7, 1820), 59-60.
Ibid., (April 29, 1820), 79-83.
Ibid.
Vives to the Secretary of State, ASPFR, IV, 680-81 [translation].
Adams, Memoirs, V (April 29, 1820), 79-83.
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Prior to this informal meeting, Vives’ mission had almost
ended before it began. On April 11, he saw Adams for the
first time and asked to present his credentials to Monroe. These
formalities were performed the next day. On April 14, the
secretary of state received a letter from Vives “opening and
almost closing his negotiations.” 39 In this communication Vives’
position was one of intransigence and made little reference to
his powers. 40 Adams was irked and his official reply requesting
a copy of Vives’ powers was toned down by President Monroe. 41
On April 19 Adams received a copy of Vives’ powers, to which
the Spanish minister attached a note specifically stating that
he was able to assure the United States that he was “fully
authorized to offer a solemn promise, in the name of the King,”
that if the differences were cleared up satisfactorily, ratification
of the Florida agreement would be attained with no delay other
than the time required to send a message to Madrid and back.
These were the same empty promises of Luis de Onis. 42
From this point on, the administration’s policy was clearly
influenced by Gallatin’s letter of February 15, 1820. In a top
level meeting held on April 20, members of the cabinet expressed their belief that Vives did not identify his full powers.
Adams was directed “to prepare a note inquiring whether
Vives was authorized, in the event of satisfactory explanation
being given him, to consent that Florida should be occupied by
us as a pledge for the ratification of the treaty at Madrid.” 43
Adams went even further; in his note he asked Vives to consent
to the United States possessing Florida before continuing with
negotiations. 44 Vives replied on April 24, denying that he possessed the powers reported by Gallatin and categorically rejecting Adam’s proposal for a Florida occupation. At a cabinet
meeting the following day, it was apparent that Secretary of
the Treasury William H. Crawford felt that the French and
Russian ministers had advised Vives “to deny his having this
authority, and told him that Congress would do nothing at all
39. Ibid., (April 11, 12, 13, 1820), 62-70.
40. Vives to the Secretary of State, ASPFR, IV, 680-81 [translation].
41. Adams, Memoirs, V (April 15, 1820), 70-71; Secretary of State to Vives,
ASPFR, IV, 681.
42. Vives to the Secretary of State, ASPFR, VI, 681 [translation].
43. Adams, Memoirs, V (April 20, 1820), 72-73.
44. Adams to Vives, ASPFR, IV, 681-82; Adams, Writings, VII, 5-8.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol48/iss3/3

10

Bisceglia: The Florida Treaty and the Gallatin-Vives Misunderstanding
G ALLATIN -V IVES

M ISUNDERSTANDING

257

events, this session.” In his Memoirs, Adams launched into a
long tirade condemning Crawford’s suspicions; yet he himself
speculated that Vives had gotten the same views from Charge
Mateo de la Serna. Yet Adams also wondered if it was still
possible “that no person has given him any expectations.” 45
By April 27 the negotiations had reached an impasse. 46
Rumors in Washington had it that an actual rupture had occurred, and even Vives became alarmed. Just then the French
minister, Hyde de Neuville, stepped in, offering his good offices
and suggesting a personal meeting between Adams and Vives.
Monroe advised his secretary to do the same. 47 Adams agreed,
even though he thought such a meeting would prove fruitless,
since Vives denied that he had any power. Adams informed de
Neuville of the information that he had received from Gallatin,
but this came as no surprise to the Frenchman since he had
received a similar estimate of Vives from Pasquier. 48 A meeting
between Adams and Vives was set up for April 29.
Adams, Memoirs, V (April 25, 1820), 74-75.
Little did Adams or Vives know that on this very day in Madrid
acting Secretary of State Juan Jabat told acting American Charge
Thomas L. L. Brent if the United States did not extend its occupation
beyond Florida, amicable relations could still be retained with Spain.
Brent to Adams, ASPFR, IV, 683. This seems to have borne out Forsyth’s observations of March 30, 1820, after his own conversation with
Jabat. Forsyth hoped that before Vives communicated the change of
government in Spain, Florida would be occupied by the United States,
or at least that Congress would pass a law “in such terms as to render
it obligatory upon the President to take it.” A delay in taking it might
be injurious because “everybody here expects it will be seized” with
no ill effects in Spain. “It is important that Florida should be in our
possession when the Cortes deliberates on the treaty.” [Ferdinand had
accepted the Constitution of 1812, which transferred sovereignty from
the King to the people. The problem of ratification was now in the
hands of the Cortes (Gazette Extraordinary of Madrid, Sunday, March
12, 1820, “Proclamation of the King to the Nation,” Annals of Congress,
XXXVII, 16th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1433-34).] Forsyth to Adams, ASPFR,
IV, 679-80. However, neither Forsyth’s nor Brent’s dispatches were to
reach Washington until after the decision for postponement had already
been made. Professor Brooks feels that both Jabat and the new Liberal
minister returning from exile, Evaristo Perez de Castro, had little influence upon these affairs. See Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands,
188, cf., Forsyth to Adams, Annals of Congress: XXXVII, 16th Cong.
2nd Sess., 1436-38.
Adams, Memoirs, V (April 26, 27, 28, 1820), 75-79.
On two occasions de Neuville expressed his belief that Vives possessed
such powers; ibid., (April 27, 1820), 77-79, (May 1, 1820), 83-88.
Adams now abandoned any previous reservations he had had about
taking possession of Florida. These reservations might have stemmed
partly from Forsyth’s earlier intimations that if the United States
occupied Florida by force, Spain would advance the land grant claims
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Up to this time Vives had conducted all negotiations by
correspondence. Adams thought this in itself unusual in view
of the importance of the matter, 49 but he was powerless to do
anything since diplomatic protocol dictated that Vives select
the negotiating instruments. The Spanish minister was no
diplomat, and he was at a decided disadvantage in any verbal
confrontation. By means of correspondence, however, he could
carefully select his words while at the same time solicit help
from his more experienced aides. The validity of this contention is clearly borne out by his conference with Adams. He
began by informing the secretary that he “was a soldier, and had
never been employed before in diplomatic negotiations,” and
that he “wished to go directly to his purpose.” 50 In the next
few minutes he committed an irretrievable blunder that plagued
him for the entire negotiations. He had been cautioned not to
discuss the Florida land grants until the United States pledged
its neutrality towards South America. 51 Vives, however, not only
discussed the grants prematurely, but exposed his entire hand
by telling Adams that they had only been a pretext and that
he himself felt that they were “null and void.” Several days
later, when Adams put the Spaniard’s statement into writing in
an official communique, Vives balked. Ashamedly, the general
claimed he had been speaking at the conference in “his individual capacity” and not as a diplomat. Adams reported: “He
said he had told me the [Florida] grants were null and void;
as a man of honor, he would not deny what he had said; but he
was afraid he had been too quick in making the concession.” 52
Could not he have made the same concession in Paris? Although he gave the Spainard the benefit of the doubt in most
of these matters, it is fairly obvious, as will soon be shown, that
before the affair was over, Adams felt very uneasy in dealing
directly with Vives.

49.
50.
51.
52.

more vigorously and gain European approval for its action. See Forsyth
to Adams (marked private), ASPFR, IV, 678. Before March 1820,
Forsyth also believed that Vives had authorization to grant the United
States possession of Florida, but at that time he felt it was a scheme
to ensnare the United States.
Monroe was equally concerned. Monroe, Writings, VI, 118-19. Adams,
Memoirs, V (April 27, 1820), 77-79.
Adams, Memoirs, V (April 29, 1820), 79-83.
Supra, 249-50.
Adams, Memoirs, V (May 1, 1820), 83-88.
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With the help of the French minister, who was delivering
messages back and forth, Vives and Adams attempted to work
out a compromise as to just what their official communiques
should contain. They failed, however, largely because neither
could agree upon what the other had said in what Vives called
their “verbal discussions.” The spectre of Gallatin’s letter was
also still before them. On May 4, along with other matters,
Adams asked de Neuville to inform Vives that because of the
nature of the American Constitution their negotiations would
have to be transmitted to Congress and would therefore be made
public. Vives retorted, “you may print whatever you please,” and
he continued to insist that he had “never told either Baron
Pasquier or Mr. Gallatin any such thing.” 53
De Neuville now changed his position in the matter. He told
Adams that he was convinced that the Spaniard was speaking
the truth, and that after rechecking his own dispatch from Paris
he discovered that Pasquier had simply stated he had reason to
believe Vives possessed this power, and had not given it as positive. Moreover, de Neuville continued, he had seen Vives’
“Journal,” written immediately after his conversation with Pasquier, and it contained nothing like such an assertion. De
Neuville described it as a “misunderstanding” that had originated with the Duke of Fernan-Nunez. According to Adams, this
was “scarcely possible,” 54 and he proceeded point by point to
refute de Neuville’s contention. The French minister had no
reply.
With respect to the origin of the statement of Vives’ powers,
de Neuville was correct. As far as all evidence has revealed,
the alleged authorization did not begin with Vives, but rather
with Fernan-Nunez or even Gallatin’s suggestion for solid
guarantees. 55 There is no answer as to why Fernan-Nunez
would create such a distortion. If his conversation with Gallatin
is recalled, it bears mentioning that he was correct in the other
two points that he elaborated upon - that Vives was not the
bearer of the King’s ratification of the Florida treaty and that
the lands grants there were not an important stumbling block
53. Ibid. (May 4, 5, 1820), 93-98; for Adams’ reply see Adams to Vives,
ASPFR, IV, 683; Adams, Writings, VII, 8-14.
54. Adams, Memoirs, V (May 5, 1820), 97-98.
55. Gallatin, Writings, II, 134.
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to ratification. Also, the confirmations and counter-confirmations lessen the weight that would be placed on the origin of
the statement of powers. Vives was the guest of Fernan-Nunez
while in Paris; the two obviously had an intimate consultation
about Vives’ mission. How else could Fernan-Nunez correctly
state the Spanish position with respect to ratification and the
land grants?
It should also be noted that de Neuville’s conclusions, drawn
after having seen Vives’ “Journal,” are not as substantial as they
at first appear. When Vives wrote his record of the conference
with Adams on April 29, the difference between his account
and Adams’ account is so great that one historian has termed it
“ludicrous.” 56 Did Vives record his faux pas on the land grants?
Would he have recorded a similar blunder in his Paris
“Journal?”
With the meeting between Adams and de Neuville on May
5, the Adams-Vives negotiations broke down altogether. Matters
now referred back to the stalemate that existed prior to the
April 29 session. Both negotiators decided to send their reports,
written shortly thereafter, unchanged. 57
The second session of the sixteenth Congress was drawing
to a close, and Monroe had to present an appraisal of the situation and proffer recommendations. On May 6, 1820, he gathered
his cabinet together to help make a decision. 58 He presented his
message to them with three different concluding paragraphs:
(1) recommending immediate occupation of Florida, (2) recommending giving the President discretionary power to take possession in the event of non-ratification of the treaty by Spain,
(3) asking Congress for a postponement of final action until the
next session. After persuasive arguments by Crawford and
Adams in favor of either the first or second recommendations,
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun seems to have swung the

56. Griffin, United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 233.
57. Adams, Writings, VII, 15-27.
58. Monroe was much concerned about the effects upon the Missouri
Compromise; see Monroe, Writings, VI, 113-14, 123. Count Poletica had
written as early as February 1820 that the Missouri problem would interfere with a settlement of the Florida question. See Worthington C.
Ford. “Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington, 18181825,” American Historical Review, XVIII (January 1913), 318-23.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol48/iss3/3

14

Bisceglia: The Florida Treaty and the Gallatin-Vives Misunderstanding
G ALLATIN -V IVES M ISUNDERSTANDING

261

pendulum back toward the side of peace 59 and the third conclusion, the course Monroe took three days later. 60
At this point Gallatin’s letter becomes of secondary importance. It had greatly contributed to the failure of the negotiations, but it was the changing situation in Spain that gave
most substantial backing to the postponements. 61 In view of the
upper hand gained by the liberals in Spain, the legality of
dealing further with Vives became questionable. Nonetheless,
repercussions from Gallatin’s letter of February 15, 1820, were
not ended. This dispatch had to accompany Monroe’s message
to Congress of May 9. Adams sent it in, and the President was
not too pleased with his secretary for doing so, especially since
Vives’ and Gallatin’s reputations were at stake. Gallatin had no
small part in making the era one “of good feeling,” and certainly was not one to make an enemy. 62 On the other hand,
Vives appeared unfazed by the whole matter, and Monroe encouraged him to reply publicly to Gallatin’s letter. This he
did officially on May 11, after the dispatches had been printed. 63
An unexpected source-Hyde de Neuville-protested, claiming
that if proven false, Baron Pasquier would lose face. De Neuville soon acquiesced, however, after Adams lectured him on the
nature of the American Constitution. 64 A more important repercussion ensued when Henry Clay, to his own surprise, managed
to have the house pass a resolution by five votes favoring
recognition of “Buenos Ayres.” Adams attributed this success
primarily to Gallatin’s and the other dispatches sent to the
house the day before. 65
59.
60.

61.

62.
63.
64.
65.

Adams, Memoirs, V (May 6, 1820), 98-103, (May 8, 1820), 105-06. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 70-72; Monroe, Writings, VI, 123-26.
Had the administration known of Forsyth’s and Brent’s dispatches in
which the new liberal Spanish government acknowledged the expectation that Florida would be occupied by the United States, even Monroe
might have been influenced to act more positively.
Monroe explained his reasons for postponement and the problems associated with the acquisition of Florida and Texas many times; see
Monroe, Writings, VI (Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, May 1820), 11923; (Monroe to General Jackson, May 23, 1820), 126-30; (Monroe to
Albert Gallatin, May 26, 1820), 130-34.
It is no mere coincidence that Gallatin received letters dated May 26,
27, 28, 1820, respectively, from Monroe, Crawford, and Adams: see
Gallatin, Writings, II, 140-46; Adams, Writings, VII, 34-36.
Vives to the Secretary of State, ASPFR, IV, 689 [translation].
Adams, Memoirs, V (May 9, 1820), 106-108.
Gallatin had stressed in his letter of February 15, 1820, that the United
States used much more circumspection in its dealings with South
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Historians have omitted or passed quickly over Gallatin’s
report, largely as a result of Gallatin’s subsequent disclaimer
letter of August 7, 1820. 6 6 In this communication Gallatin labelled the whole affair a misunderstanding. In a discussion with
Baron Pasquier, seven months after Vives’ meeting of February
1820, Gallatin learned that he had misunderstood the French
minister of foreign affairs. Pasquier now claimed that he had
derived his information from Fernan-Nunez and not General
Vives. Gallatin further attributed the misunderstanding to the
confusion of a crowded dining room in which the meeting took
place and to the fact that Vives did not speak perfect French.
It is important to remember, however, that in the intervening
seven months a good deal happened which could have influenced
the stories then told. Hyde de Neuville undoubtedly wrote to
Pasquier about the publication of Gallatin’s letter with its
references to the Baron. Indeed, newspaper accounts had already reached Gallatin in Paris. Also Fernan-Nunez had long
since departed from Paris and could not answer these allegations. It is also important to remember that Pasquier did
speak perfect French and that Gallatin had confirmed his report with Pasquier before he had left the room. A further point
worth mentioning is that when Gallatin reported to John
Forsyth in Spain the substance of his conversation with Vives,
Forsyth wrote back in a letter of May 11, 1820, “that the government of Spain expected and would not complain of the occupation of territory.” 67
Probably equally as important as to whether or not the whole
affair was a “misunderstanding,” is the fact that Adams believed
what Gallatin had reported to be true, and he distrusted Vives
not because he questioned his veracity, but because of the uncertainty in dealing with a diplomatic novice in matters of such
magnitude. In justifying his sending of Gallatin’s letter of
February 15, 1820, to Congress, Adams wrote, “I thought it indispensable to make the case for Congress to consider, and did

America than either England or France; Gallatin, Writings, II, 131.
Clay used this reference to draw attention of the house to the timidity
of Monroe’s policy toward the rebellious Spanish colonies. Henry Clay,
Papers, II, 853-60; cf., Adams, Memoirs, V (May 11, 1820), 111.
66. Gallatin, Writings, II, 165-67.
67. Ibid., 166.
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not believe that Gallatin had misunderstood Vives.”
Furthermore, in his letter to Gallatin of May 28 (to which he appended
Vives’ published denials) Adams clearly indicates that he does
not want to experience the same embarrassment felt by Jefferson
in his verbal dealings with Citizen Genet. 69 Adams informed
Gallatin that it was of vital importance that the very fact that
Vives had been “misunderstood” in Paris should be made public
in case another “misunderstanding” occurred about the Spaniard’s negotiations in Washington. Undoubtedly, Adams was
thinking of his own conferences with Vives, especially the one
of April 29, and the subsequent references to their “verbal
discussions.” 70
In summary, then, one can see that it is fairly clear General
Vives’ mission was speeded up because of the reported threats
to Spanish lands beyond the Sabine River. Because of the confusion in Spain it is possible that Vives had a verbal authorization to yield the Florida territory to save Texas. It follows
that there is a possibility that the meeting in Paris was not based
upon a “misunderstanding,” and that Gallatin’s report was accurate at the time; but upon reaching the United States, Vives
saw and heard that the reported aggressions had been greatly
exaggerated and had little to do with the official policy of the
United States government. It is also clear that Vives was not
a qualified diplomat. Given these factors it is possible to construct a case that Vives might have had verbal authorization.
Unfortunately, no document as such has been found to build a
proven case. One thing is certain, however, that Gallatin’s
letter of February 15, 1820, by reinforcing Adams’ own ideas
and those of some other members of the cabinet, helped shape
the course and final impasse of the Vives negotiations.
68. Adams, Memoirs, V (May 10, 1820), 110.
69. Monroe had earlier cautioned Adams about this when inquiring what
Vives meant by “verbal discussions,” ibid. (May 6, 1820), 98-103.
70. Adams, Writings, VII, 33-36.
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